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Introduction to Developmental and Historical Structuralism
Klaus F. Riegel
The following essay introduces structuralism from several different angles.
In the first section of this introduction, the concept of structure (and in
extension those of schema, pattern, gestalt, etc.) will be contrasted with
that of function (and in extension those of activity, interaction, transforma-
tion, etc.). Such a comparison will not merely reconfirm the old dichotomy
as introduced into psychology by James and Titchner, but will emphasize the
mutual dependency of structure and functions. In this attempt we rely on
Piaget's interpretations and, thus, emphasize genetic aspects. Reference
will also be given to recent trends in linguistics, especially to Chomsky's
transformational grammar.
In the second section, we trace the origin of these ideas to some reformu-
lations in mathematics proposed during the second half of the 19th century by
Dedekind, Frege, Russell and others. The new emphasis stressed the analysis
of relational orders and classes and thus contributed to the foundation for
structural interpretations.
Further steps in this direction were taken in Carnap's early work, which
is represented in the third section. Carnap provides explicit descriptions of
structural interpretations, by relying on some positivists of the late 19th
century, especially Mach, Poincare and Avenarius. whose contributions--
unfortunately--have frequently been viewed in clear antithesis to structural
descriptions. Carnap's interpretations come closest to those held by Avenarius;
Mach relates to the psychologism of Wundt, and Poincare to the early positivism
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of Comte. Poincare, in turn, influences the school of French sociology with
DUrkheim, Mauss, Blondel, Halbwachs, and Levy-BrUhl, which finally leads to
the structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss and to the genetic structuralism
of Piaget.
In the fourth section we question, in alliance with modern sociologists
and anthropologists, the role of the psychic self as a primary base of knowl-
edge and of psychology as an independent science. Piaget has been criticized
for viewing development as emerging, essentially, from within the individual
and for failing to give equally strong emphasis to the interactive changes
of the socia-historical conditions. Rubinstejn's theory, with which we
conclude our presentation, proposed such a dialectic interpretation of a
changing organism in a changing world.
Psychology and Linguistics
Early Structuralism
The distinction between structure and function gained its directive
influence upon psychology through Titchner. Although previously discussed by
James (1890) (see also Ruckmick, 1911), Titchner (1898) elaborated this distinc-
tion in detail and thereby, paradoxically, helped his adversaries in founding
functionalism in America (Boring, 1957, p. 555). Titchner, by drawing an
analogy from biology, proposed a threefold distinction.
We may enquire into the structure of an organism, without re-
gard to function--by analysis determining its component parts, and
by synthes is exhib i ting the mode of its formation from the parts.
Or we may enquire into the function of the various structures which
our analysis has revealed, and into the manner of their interrelation
as functional organs. Or, again, we may enquire into the changes of
form and function that accompany tfue persistence of the organism in
time, the phenomena of growth aud of decay. Biology, the science of
living things, comprises the three mutually interdependent sciences
of morphology, physiology, and ontogeny [1898, p. 449].
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Titchner delineates this distinction not only in regard to the individual
organism but also in regard to the species, the "collective life. 1I He
continues:
Corresponding to morphology, we have taxonomy or systematic
zoology, the science of classification. The whole world of living
things is here the organism. and species and sub-species and races
are its parts. Corresponding to physiology, we have that depart-
ment of biology--it has been termed "oecologyll--which deals with
questions of geographical distribution, of the function of species
in the general economy of nature. Corresponding to ontogeny we
have the science of phylogeny: the biology of evolution, with
its problems of descent and of transmission [1898, p. 449].
Titchner's contrastive description of structuralism and functionalism
(under exclusion of the third major possibility for scientific psychology,
geneticism) has had a formativein£1uence upon the development of American
psychology or, at least, for its historical description (especially through
Boring's work, 1957). Nevertheless, his view of structure, being atomistic
and mechanistic, was an exceptionally unfortunate choice. More appropriately,
his approach ought to be called the "psychology of content," a denotation
commonly reserved for Wundt in distinction to the IIpsychology of act" by
Brentano. Titchner's structuralism emphasizes the analytic identification
of psychic constituents (sensations, ideas and emotions). Organizational
aspects enter into the discussion only secondarily.
Gestalt Psychology
Structural considerations were firmly introduced into psychology by the
Gestalt movement of Werthei~er, KBhler and Koffka. Here, organized patterns
become the foundation of scientific inquiries as well as of the phenomenal
experience of subjects. The identification of constituent elements attains
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negligible importance if any importance at all. As for Titchner, genetic
aspects remain neglected. Gestalt psychologists analyze psychic conditions
from an "a-historical" point of view. They are concerned, however, with
functional aspects which, as introduced by the forerunner of Gestalt
psychology, von Ehrenfe1s (1890), are implied in the so-called "second law
of Gestalt."
As commonly expressed, the "first law" stat~s that a Gestalt is more
than the sum of its parts, i.e., organizational, structural properties are
implied. The "second law" concerns transpositions or transformations through
which all parts may lose their absolute positions, though the structural
properties are retained, i.e., are kept invariant. Convincing cases of the
"second law" are the transpositions of a melody into different keys, or in
a more general sense (Le., keeping fewer properties invariant), the variations
upon a musical theme. In regard to spatio-visua1 conditions, the perception
of a simple object, e.g., a suspended triangle, is subject to ceaseless trans-
formations. Not only does the location, illumination and color of the object
change relative to the observer, but also the sensory organs of the observer
himself undergo ceaseless transformations produced by their gross and fine
movements. Thus, the scientific exploration of perceived patterns is as
much an abstraction from the ongoing physical and psychic activities as was
the abstraction of constituent elements from these patterns by the pre-
Gestalt psychologists. What unaer1ies both these abstractions, and therefore
ought to be of main interest to the psychologist, are ceaseless sequences of
transformations.
Gestalt psychologists recognized this issue, especially through their
investig~tion of the phi-phenomenon. The phi-phenomenon is produced by
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sWitching two light sources on and off. Dependent upon the rate of switching,
the lights are e Lt.hez perceived as alternating discrete stimuli, as two
continuously lighted stimuli, or as a connecting lighted line. These investi-
gations have primarily been used in refutation of earlier atomistic viewpoints
in that they question the identifiability of discrete sensory elements. They
could be used equally well to criticize the preponderance of stimulus patterns.
The investigations of the phi-phenomenon clearly support a transformational
or transactional interpretation. The opposite dominated, however, through
K~hler's (1920) analysis of the isomorphism between external physical and
internal neuroph.ysiological pa t t e rns with its implied priority of the former
in the tradition of philosophical realism. A convincing argument for trans-
position as the key principle has been published by Witte (1960). More
recently, Henle (l972) has thoroughly reviewed Wolfgang KbhLer l s contribu-
tions to this discussion.
Cognitive Developmental Psychology
Among present-day psychologists, only Piaget (1970) has drawn a conclusion
similar to the transformationists, and has, thereby, reversed the order of
the laws of Gestalt psychology. The "law of transposition," now, gains priority
over the "law of the Gestalt." As an organism engages physiologically and
psychologically in ceaseless transformations, it attains patterns during its
internal transitions and attends to patterns as transitional conditions.
These pat t.e rns represent momentari.ly objectified states of equilibrium, the
organism moves forward through a stream of transactions. In his considerations,
Piaget is willing to conclude that "transformations may be disengaged from the
objects subject to such transformation and the group defined solely in te~s
of the set of transformations [Pf.age t , 1970, pp. 23-24J. II
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Piaget is, of course, best known for his "stage theory II in which he
proposes a fixed sequence of synchronic structures for the characterization
of developmental pr~gression. If we take the above quotation seriously,
however, development should be characterized by groups of permissible trans-
formations rather than by fixed forms or schemata. Such a notion implies
th~t the freedom of transformation is never unlimited. In regard to math~
matical systems, e.g., measurement scales, it implies that basic properties
have to be kept "invariant," e s g . , in metric systems the relative distances
between points. In Piaget's theory of cognitive development, conditions of
invariance are represented as temporary states of equilibrium from which the
individual will constantly divert, but to which he will always return.
With this emphasis on transformational processes Piaget ,at the same
time, inverts the meaning of structure and function as originally conceived
by Titchner. Now structures emerge through continuous transformational
activities; they are, in other words, determined by functions. Moreover,
structures emerge from within, whereas for Gestalt psychologists they
originate from without. In further contrast to these and to most other
structuralists, Piaget relates both the concepts of structure and function
to genetic interpretations. Structures do not only emerge through trans-
formations but are subjected to continuous changes. The individual's develop-
ment is characterized by shifts in structures brought about by transformational
activities. Thus, Piaget relates all three aspects of Titchner's outline to
one another; his theory is structural, functional, and genetic. Development
is not characterized any longer as a sequence of synchronic schemata, but
by diachronic clusters of transformations.
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Linguis tics
Piaget's emphasis upon the connection between structures and transfor-
mations directs our attention to some recent developments in linguistics.
More distinctly than in psychology, two major schools in linguistics have
been called "structuralists" and "transformationists." The former adopted
the methodology of the behaviorists in order to determine the major form
classes and their arrangements in the natural language. With their emphasis
upon methodological rigor, they share with the behaviorists a disrespect
for any notions about underlying organizations, forces or meanings. They
initiate their inquiries from and on the surface of the linguistic corpus.
Quite paradoxically, of course, the denotation of these linguists as
"structuralists" cannot be transferred to their allies, the "behaviorists, II
who, from Titchner's point of view, were regarded as "functionalists. 1I He
reserved the label of "structuralism" for his own school of introspective
elementarism.
Structuralism, as proposed by Bloomfield (1933), dominated American
linguistics for many decades. Although objections were expressed repeatedly--
for instance, Jesperson (1937) claimed that the purpose of a linguistic analysis
is "to denote all the most important interrelations of words and parts of
words in connected speech • . • • Forms as such have no place in the system
(1937, pp. 13 and 104]1I--a major revision was not undertaken until the appear-
ance of Chomsky's transformational grammar.
As for Piaget, Chomsky's (1957, 1959) publications reveal some major
changes in his own thinking. He started out with describing alternative
models of syntactic structures (1957) and by po1emizing against behavioristic
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interpretations (1959). Then he elaborated his syntactic theory (Chomsky,
1965, 1968) which is of primary interest for our present discussion. His
most r~cent interpretations, nevertheless, are not as radical as those by
Piaget (1970). In contrast to Piaget's transformationism, Chomsky argues
at two distinct levels: for grammars of the surface structures of the
natural languages and for an underlying universal deep structure. Most
of his efforts are directed toward the delineation of the Lat.t er , As this
is achieved, attention can shift toward the specification of transformation
rules by which the former are derived from the latter. Transformations are
thus performed upon given structures and do not attain the priority that
Piaget is willing to assign to them. Instead of considering these trans-
formations as the universal basis, they merely operate upon the deep structure
to which such a priority is assigned. Not surprisingly, therefore, some of
his followers (Lenneberg, 1967; McNeill, 1968, 1970) have identified these
universal forms of the deep structure with innate schemata of the organisms,
and thus have revitalized the nativism of 19th century psychology. What
needs to be done is to relate the transformations to intrinsic activities
of the organism but not to their forms.
The concept of "t rans fo rmat Lon," as used by modern linguists, creates as
many difficulties as the concept of "structuretl as used by Titchner. Trans-
formations have their well-defined place in the logic and mathematics of
numerical systems. As first elaborated by HBlder (1901) and discussed in
many different treatises in the behavioral and social sciences (see Stevens,
1951; Coombs, 1964) measurements can be based upon numerical systems of
varying complexity, i. e., upon cardinal, ordinal, rational systems, etc.
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As their complexity increases (and with it the number of operative pre-
requisites that have to be fulfilled), the complexity of the transformations
that can be imposed upon these systems decreases. Thus cardinal numbers can
be subjected to a wide range of transformations, rational numbers only to
a few. In other words, with increasing complexity, larger sets of properties
have to be kept invariant unless the structure of the whole system is to be
invalidated.
Whereas the structure of these numerical systems and their sets of
permissible transformations can be specified with precision, the use of the
latter term in linguistics is rather ambiguous. Linguistic transformations
do not only change the order of items within strings but also basic features
of expressions--for example, they change declarative statements into negatives,
questions, passives, and vice versa. Since the dimensions of linguistic
expressions are difficult to determine and vary from investigation to
investigation, linguistic transformations also lack descriptive rigor. In
particular. the invariant properties are not spelled out. Indeed, mathemati-
cians seem to emphasize the invariances; linguists point to the modifications
brought about by transformations.
Mathematics
Theories of Numbers
In discussing some reformulations in mathematical thinking which contri-
buted to the development of modern structuralism, we direct our attention to
the work of Cassirer (1910). As implied in the German title of his book,
The Concepts of Substance and Functions. early philosophizing relied heavily
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upon the concept of smallest, substantive elements. With the objective basis
of these particles taken for granted, the task for philosophy and sciences
consisted in analyzing the systematic connections between them. In opposition
to such conceptualizations, Cassirer argues for the priority of functional
relations or operations, a switch in thinking which characterizes structural
interpretations. This shift in conceptualization also occurred in mathematics.
During the early historical periods, at leas.t up to Descartes, mathematics
was seen as a reflection of or an ideal abstraction from the ~eal world with
its substantial particle properties. A major reformulation was brought about
by Leibniz for whom the basis of knowledge did not lie in the reflection and
abstraction of ideas themselves but in the relationship between ideas. As
a general example of this change in thinking consider the notion of geometrical
points and lines. Traditionally, points were taken for granted and, there-
after~ notions about their shortest connections, i.e., through straight lines,
were derived. Thus, the solution was achieved through operations performed
upon these points. Similarly in algebra, the natural numbers, as experienced
by counting real objects, were taken for granted. Whenever problems arose,
e.g., when a larger number was to be sUbtracted from a smaller one, extensions
of the system were introduced, in this case, an extension into the domain of
negative numbers. In many other cases, new numbers were intersper~ed between
the natural numbers, such as fractional, irrational, and imaginary numbers.
Thereby, the notions of the infinity in extension and in partition of the
domain of numbers emerged. But at the same time, it became even more
apparent that the prerequisites, which made these developments possible, lie
in our full use of operative capabilities rather than in better and better
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approximations of the range of real objects. In other words, mathematics
began to be seen as a system of operations rather than as a reflection of
substantive conglomerates. Since the full range of these operations has
been hardly explored, many new forms of mathematics could emerge. Develop-
ments since the second half of the 19th century have confirmed this possi-
bility, leading to non-Euclidean geometries and to some of the number
systems mentioned above.
Related to these developments are changes in the concepts of time and
space (Cohen, 1972; Riegel, 1972c). Traditionally, time had been regarded
as finite and discrete; thus, the concept of time was similar to the concept
of substance. As the natural number system was extended and as the slots
between numbers were filled to a greater and greater extent, the notion of
infinity was introduced through induction. Now, instead of emphasizing the
periodicity of time, its beginning and its end, an abstract continuum was
derived. To Cassirer, however, the question of whether time is discrete or
continuous, finite or infinite, relative or absolute depends solely upon
the operations selected by the observer and not upon external, nonintellectual
criteria.
Cassirer relates our conception of time to the theories of numbers and
algebra. Geometry, on the other hand, he relates to the simultaneity and
coexistence of several such number systems. Subsequently, also our concept
of space can be continuous or discrete, absolute or relative, Euclidean or
non-Euclidean. Originally, according to Cassirer, the concept of space was
discrete. and bound by the three dimensionality of our experience. Through
inductive generalizations the notion of a continuous space was derived and
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attempts were made to shift from the three dimensions of the experienced
space to nan-Euclidean interpretations. Although this has been intellectually
achieved, Cassirer insists that our conception of space ought not to be
regarded as a generalization from objective, substantive conditions of the
real world, but rather as a fuller elaboration of our intellectual operations
which enable us to generate these notions as well as many others not yet
proposed.
Dedekind, Frege, and Russell
Cassirer's views. which occasionally have been called "logical idealism,"
are shared by the mathematician Dedekind (1893) who argues that our concept
of numbers, being a representation of pure laws of thinking, is independent
from our conceptions of space and time. Quite to the contrary, only through
the logical derivation of a theory of numbers and the attainment of a mono-
tone domain of numbers have we become able to explicate our conceptions of
space and time. If, in the pursuit of these explorations, we try "to determine
what we are doing when counting a class or a number of things, we are bound to
recognize the capability of the mind to relate things to things, to compare
one thing with another, or to map one thing upon another; without this
capability thought would not be possible at all [Dedekind, 1893, pp. III-IV,
author's t ranslat ion] • "
According to Dedekind, our basic conception of numbers is relational.
Thro~gh implicit mental comparisons we derive ordinal numbers. By explica-
tion we become able to categorize numbers or items. For example, we might,
within a given range, group all those items into a class which are below a
certain value a. Items above that value are assigned to a different class.
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Following this procedure (the well-known Dedekind "incision") t the criterion
itself t ~t cannot belong to either of the two classes which it defines.
Therefore t we need to elaborate other operations that will lead to a new
numerical system and include the criterion ~t i.e. t the system of irrational
numbers. By applying these deductive procedures step by step and thereby
extending the domain of numbers encompassed, Dedekind and the following
generation of mathematicians succeeded in deriving the whole field of
mathematics from this basis.
For this purpose it was first necessary to deduce the system of ordinal
numbers. This was done by applying Dedekind's procedure repeatedly, thus
generating the classes A and B J on the one hand, and C and D on the other.
If there is an element which belongs to the class A of the first incision
and to the class D of the second incision t then we would call the first
categorization larger and let it follow the second one in a sequence. Thus t
a criterion is given which t when applied repeatedly, generates a completely
ordered system of numbers.
Dedekind's procedure is based on ordinal judgments. For the derivation
of cardinal numbers and categorizations in general--it has been argued by
Frege (1903) and Russell (1903)--judgments of equivalence are more fundamental.
Contrary to the traditional conception J according to which numbers are con-
sidered as given and t subsequentlYt judged as equivalent or not, it is the
goal of their approach to determine an operation of equivalence first t and
then to derive sets of equivalent and nonequivalent numbers on the basis of
such an operation. As stated by Erege , "It is our intention to form the
content of an operation which can be expressed in an equation in such a way
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that there is a number on each side of it . . . . Thus, by means of the
familiar concept of equivalence we are to obtain what we have to consider
as equal [1903, p. 27]."
In comparing the approach by Dedekind and Cassirer with that by Frege
and Russell, their similarities and dialectic interdependencies need to be
emphasized. First, both camps rely on relations--the former, in general,
on asymmetric relations of different kinds, the latter on the symmetric
relation of equivalence. Second, both emphasize operative, constructive
aspects through which complex structures are derived. They neither regard
these structures nor the equivalences and relations as given in the external
world but as founded in the operations of the organism. Thus, their inter-
pretations are closely in line and anticipate Piaget's cognitive developmental
theory. They are at variance, however, with sociocultural theories which
assign, at least in part, these operative, constructive or transformational
activities to society which, in turn, will determine, at least in part, the
activities of the individual. Before we discuss these modern trends, a brief
overview will be given of some recent philosophical developments which parallel
those in mathematical theory. In particular, we will refer toCarnap's (1928)
early work.
Philosophy
Positivism and Conventionalism
The philosophical roots of modern structuralism lie in rather unusual
grounds which, at first sight, we migh.t not at all connect with such an inter-
pretation. This is due to some common misconceptions about these schools,
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especially those of French and German positivism and, to a lesser extent,
phenomenologism.
The German positivism of the late 19th century became instrumental and
supportive for a scientific psychology of which Titchner was one of the late
representatives. Contrary to frequent statements, especially expressed by
American writers, positivism of this type was not at all supporting a blind
search for "facts" but would argue against the notion of "facts ll as a form
of evidence ihdependent of the observer and solely determined by external
conditions of "nature." To Mach (1886), for example, there were only sensory
impressions; all knowledge had to be derived from them and, thus, was in the
mind. He strongly supported the rrpsychologism" of the late 19th century--
which epistemologically subordinated all other sciences under psychology--
and emphasized, though timidly, the constructive aspects of scientific
efforts in maintaining that IIfacts" are merely theories to which we have
become sufficiently accustomed.
Quite similar in orientation, though with much stronger emphasis on the
sociocultural basis of knowledge, Poincare's conventionalism leads us far
back in the history of philosophy, at least to Locke's critical realism.
The notion of sociolinguistic conventions was introduced in order to account
for the agreement between different observers in regard to secondary qualities,
i.e., those qualities that do not directly reflect properties of nature
(primary qualities) but depend upon the observers' interpretations, such as
his impressions of warmth, redness, brightness, etc. Poincare carries this
interpretation to its conclusion by considering all our impressions (not only
those representing secondary qualities) as dependent upon sociolinguistic
conventions. Each individual has his subjective experiences; in order to
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make general knowledge possible, certain agreements have to be reached on
how to talk about these impressions. Subsequently, knowledge is not only
dependent upon the sensory impressions and observations but upon the con-
structive efforts on the part of the observers to state their experience
in communicable terms.
The last issue receives focused attention in the work of Avenarius "
(1894/5) who, for the first time, emphasized logical and syntactic organi-
zations as a necessary prereq~isite for the acquisition of knowledge. While
previously the agreement on communicable concepts was stressed, Avenarius
pointed to the need for consensus about logical and linguistic structures.
To Avenarius these structures are arbitrarily selected in about the same
way in which rules of a game, such as chess, are being set up. There is
neither intrinsic nor extrinsic validity in these systems; their value is
dependent upon criteria such as internal consistency, simplicity, and
comprehensiveness.
Constructivism
Avenarius' interpretations failed to have a major effect upon the
philosophy and the execution of the behavioral and social sciences. His
ideas gained considerable importance, however, through .the extensions by
the early Carnap (1928). Accepting the shift from substantive to functional
conceptualization (Cassirer, 1910), Carnap elaborated structural interpreta-
tions with a strong nominalistic and constructivistic emphasis. He traced
his interpretations to Russell's (1903) theory of relations and to the
"reduction of 'reality' to the 'given' [1928, p. 7]" as successfully performed
by Avenar tus , Mach, Poincare, KUlpe, Ziehen, and Driesch. The "gfvena'' have
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to be sought in the unmediated, phenomenal experience. Rather than halting
at such contemplative state, Carnap asks that out of these experiences
constructive steps have to be taken. Knowledge does not so much consist
in introspective apprehension but in active construction. At the beginning,
he would agree with Cassirer (1910), that it is not the sensory impression
but the sentence (rrSatzrr as related to "setzen," "p r opos Lng'") which alone
generates knowledge by making it communicable, social, and human.
There are two basic components upon which individual and scientific
knowledge is based: property description and relation description.
A ~roperty description indicates the properties which the
individual objects of a given domain have, while a relation
description indicates the relations which hold between these
objects, but does not make any assertion about the objects as
individuals. Thus, a property description makes individual or,
in a sense, absolute, assertions while a relation description
makes relative assertions [Carnap, 1967, p. 19].
While the present author would take exception to the notion that property
descriptions are nonre1ationa1 (see chapter VIII), Carnap's main attention,
anyhow, centers around the relation descriptions. Construction of knowledge
consists in transforming relation descriptions (which ultimately might have
been generated from property descriptions) according to construction rules
or constructional definitions .
.••• to construct ~ out of~, ~ means to produce a general
rule that indicates for each individual case how a statement
about a must be transformed in order to yield a statement about
~' £ [Carnap, 1967, p. 6].
The development of constructivism has been prepared by Poincare's emphasis
that knowledge cannot be based upon the "givens" alone, e.g., sensations, but
that "only relations between the sensations have an objective value [Poincare,
1902, p , 198." For Carriap , this move, although in the right direction, does
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not go far enough. Scientific knowledge becomes possible only through the
systematic explication of the interrelation of relations, i.e., through the
study of structures. Ultimately, all knowledge is structural and is removed
and separated from its base, the property descriptions or, in Poincare's
sense, the relations with objective value.
Within a system of structural description, Carnap distinguishes two kinds
of definitions: Ostensive definitions and definite descriptions. The former
resemble property descriptions but are stated in relational terms.
Here, " ••• the obj ect which is meant is brough t within the
range of perception and is then indicated by an appropriate
gesture, e.g., 'That is Mont Blanc' ••• definite descriptions •••
list ••• essential characteristics, but only as many••• as are
required to recognize unequivocally the object which is meant
within the object domain under discussion," e. g., "Mont Blanc
indicates the highest mountain in the Alps," or••• "the mountain
so many kilometers east of Geneva [Carnap, 1928, p. 24]."
While empirical sciences have to incorporate ostensive statements in
order to relate to their specialized fields of observations, science will,
ultimately, remove itself from this basis through purely formal, structural
descriptions. Scientific disciplines differ in the degree to which such
transformations have been accomplished. Physics, in certain areas, Can be
removed from its ostensive basis. Psychology has not reached such an
advanced status. According to Carnap, such "de-subjectivization" will
always result in formal structural descriptions. "Each scientific state-
ment can in principle be so transformed that it is nothing but a structural
statement [Carnap, 1928, p. 29]."
An Example of Structural Description
Carnap provides a simple demonstration of structural descriptions, the
example of a railroad schedule. From such a record sufficient specifications
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can be deduced in regard to any point (in this case. station) without going
outside of the system. Our own analysis of language and meaning--we believe--
represents an equally strong demonstration (see Riegel, 1970).
Contrary to common as well as to scientific conceptions, meaning is a
relation (or rather a set of relations); concrete experience consists of
such relations; elements and words are abstractions. Early in life and in
unfamiliar situations, meaning is introduced through ostensive or, more
generally, extralingual relations, i. e." t by pointing toward labeled objects
and qualities. or by directing or performing requested actions. These
extralingual relations represent, however, exceptional circumstances for
depicting the meaning of objects, events, or qualities. Regularly, such
information will be substituted by intralingual relations. We will, for
example, explicate the meaning of ZEBRA by saying that it "is an ANIMAL,
has STRIPES, is found in AFRICA, is like a HORSE, etc." rather than by
pointing at one.
Such explications presuppose that the listener has already acquired a
repertoire of relational expressions so that he may insert the new information
into the network available to him. This is achieved,for ins t.an ce ; by both
relating and differentiating ZEBRA from other ANIMALS, by grouping ZEBRA
into its spatial location, by recognizing the criterialattributes of ZEBRA,
etc. Undoubtedly, the meaning of ZEBRA. as explicated through these rela-
tional statements, is incomplete (e.g., for zoological purposes) and subjective
both in regard to the speaker and the listener. There is no assurance but,
in principle, doubt that both will imply precisely the same understanding of
the term. ZEBRA for one might denote a dangerous beast, for the other a
handsome creature.
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In spite of these idiosyncratic interpretations, communication is pos-
sible as long as, within a limited group of speakers, major sections of
such a relational structure are being shared. Individuals will communicate
within the boundaries of such networks by attending to subsections, such as
those included in our example above. Under still more limited conditions
(e.g., if only the information "ANIMAL with STRIPES" is transmitted leading
in turn to multiple interpretations, such as ZEBRA, TIGER or HYENA), the
need may arise to extend the subset within the relational network by including
references to specific locations, i.e~, AFRICA or INDIA, to types, i.e., HORSE
or CAT, etc. In other words, the domain of the relational structure will
vary along numerous dimensions, such as individuals (abilities, age), groups
(language, sex, occupation), situations (school, job site, cocktail party),
etc. Theoretically, the structure can always be extended to make a dis-
ambiguation possible. The repertoire of linguistic expressions is rich
enough or can always be enriched to make identifications possible.
Our last remarks call attention to the fluctuating and shifting state of
relational structures. Such conditions are characteristic, in particular,
of languages. The example used by Carnap (1928, pp. 25-27), Le., that of
a railroad network, is less convincing in this regard, because it seems
unreasonable to consider this structure, L, e.. , the system of railroad tracks,
as anything but fixed. To depict this structure by activities, i.e., by the
moving trains, would be unusual. Language, however, might well be regarded
as a system of activities. Its underlying neuroanatomical organization is
known only in its grossest features and any particular nervous impulse may
reach a cortical destination simultaneously along many alternative tracks,
-21-
Moreover, neither the source nor the destination are firmly fixed. Thus,
neither the tracks (relations) nor the intersections (elements) are firmly
fixed. In most psychological and sociological interpretations, however,
the notion of fixed structures has been given preference. Traditionally
language, too, has been regarded as a system of elements (words) and
connections (associations), but rarely as a system of transformed energies.
Language has always been regarded as an objectified product but not as
transformational labor. With this example, we are also led, once more,
to our earlier contrastive comparison between the major trend in Gestalt
psychology and Piaget, the former emphasizing the priority of organized
structure, the latter the transformational activity.
Sociology and Anthropology
French Sociology
The contributions of the three positivists of the late 19th century have
supplemented one another. Mach, in his analysis of sensory impressions, ex-
plored the foundation of the experimental psychology of Helmholz, Wurtdt,
KUlpe and Titchner. His French counterpart, Poincare, in following the
tradition initiated by the founder of positivism, Auguste Comte, emphasized
the conventional and communicative basis of knowledge and thus gave main
attention to sociology and linguistics. Finally, Avenarius explored the
logical structure of knowledge and thereby synthesized the trends explored
by Mach and Poincare. In the present section, we elaborate further the
contributions by French sociologists and anthropologists.
Because psychic processes could become an object of scientific explora-
tions only if the objective conditions were observed which cause their
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occurrence ~d progression, Comte, in his classification of the sciences,
did not assign a separate place to psychology. The requested observations
would either have to focus upon the anatomical and physiological basis of
the organism or upon the conditions and development of the social milieu.
During his later years Comte paid increasing attention to these sociological
aspects. This tradition was continued by Poincar~ and led to the foundation
of the French school of sociology.
In contrast to their British counterparts who like Taylor and Fraser
would insist upon the universal permanence of human traits, French socio-
logists, led by DUrkheim (1912), regarded psychic functions as a product
of social conditions and therefore as variable. Perhaps even more important
than such a sociologization of psychology, sociology became psychologized.
This trend is most clearly expressed in DUrkheim's concept of "collective
images" and "collective mind," both of which are psychological terms
generalized to sociology. Everything social consists of images or is the
product of images. Although these images cannot be reduced to physical
conditions, man exists, at the same time, as a physical being. Thus,
DUrkheim supports a distinct dualism: Man is both an individual physical
and a communal social being. If one were to approach a study of psychology
at all, it would have to consist either of psychophysiology or of psycho-
sociology. The object for sociology, on the other hand, the collective mind,
is independent of the individual and his consciousness.
nUrkheim, together with Mauss (1903), applied this conceptualization to
the study of intellectual functions. Logical categories were seen as origi-
nating from social relations. The concept of space, for example, was derived
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from the notion of social territory and forces. Similarly, Halbwachs (1925.
1950) analyzed the social conditions of memory by explaining that in recall
we reconstruct past events by. connecting them with conditions of the social
life. Blondel (928), finally, combines interpretations of the collective
mind with Bergson's idea of an individualistic elan vital. In his analyses
of such psychological constructs as volition, affects. and perceptions, he
transcends DUrkheim's formulation. Instead of eliminating psychology in
favor of biological and, especially, sociological interpretations. he
proposes individual psychology as a third approach. For example, the study
of perception has to be concerned with collective aspects insofar as it deals
with general concepts, such as "book,1t "table," etc. On the other hand, it
has to be .concerned with neurophysiological and anatomical conditions, equally
general and common to all human beings. But finally, the study of perception
also has to be concerned with experiences that are unique for an individual.
It is on this last issue that Blondel deviates from DUrkheim's dualistic
conception and reintroduces psychology as a third form of exploration.
Blondel's deviation from DUrkheim was criticized by Halbwachs (1929)
for fa~ling to recognize sufficiently the formative role of social customs,
habits, and concepts. An individual outside of society, Halbwachs maintains.
would not be able to function generatively. The discrepancy between these
two ways of thinking becomes most apparent in Blondel' s analysis of volition.
On the one hand, volition originates from biological r efLexes , on the other,
it represents an act which is distinctly social in nature. Although genetic
connection does not exist between these two forms of volition, there exists.
in between, an individual will which is psychological in nature and free.
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Of course, most people do not develop such a tendency; they are solely directed
by collective volition to which "they subject themselves "obediently" and by
their biological drives to which they submit themselves in an equally
"obedient" manner. Only the intellectual "elite" is capable of developing
individual volition.
Blondel's interpretations share basic features with the cultural anthro-
pology of Levy-BrUhl (1922) and, although they are nongenetic, they are:
similar to the cognitive developmental psychology of the early Piaget (1928).
Levy-BrUhl adopts from DUrkheim the concept of the collective images. But
while DUrkheim postulates a "collective subject" as the carrier of these
images, Levy-BrUhl rejects such a metaphysical construct. For Levy-BrUhl
"collective images," although they are determined by the society, are
conceptions of and located in the individual. Closely in line with Blonde1's
distinction, Levy-BrUhl investigates different levels of the collective mind.
He isknown·for his study of the "primitive mind," which he contrasts sharply
with that of modern man without emphasizing--as DUrkheim did--the continuity
in the development of the human race and human consciousness.
In more recent years, these different trends--as convincingly shown by
Leach (1970)-~merge into the functionalism of anthropologists like Malinowski
(1926) and the structuralism of Levi-Strauss (1958). It is also at this
juncture that one of Piaget's (1928) early contributions attains significance.
Piaget tries to resolve the conflict between DUrkheim's emphasis of the
continuity in the development of man and .Levy-BrUhl's emphasis upon qualita-
tive differences by elaborating his famous distinction between functions
and schemata. Functions remain the same throughout the stages of human
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evolution and individual development; schemata change~ like organs in the
evolution of species~ or forms of logical operations in the development
of the individual. In both cases, functions and schemata complement one
another; functions do not exist without schemata and schemata do not exist
without functions.
In his early writings, Piaget (especially 1923, 1924) reveals the
influence of the social psychology of Blondel and the anthropology of Levy-
BrUhl. Indeed~ he succeeded in fusing the sharp dichotomy created by
DUrkheim between the inner biological and the outer social nature of man.
These were also the years when he contributed his interpretations of the
development of language functions in terms of egocentric and socialized
speech which were rebutted by Vigotsky (1962). In his later writings~ Piaget
abandoned his emphasis upon the impact of social conditions~ however~ and
increasingly focused his attention upon psychic structures and functions.
Thus the antithesis to the viewpoints emerging from the followers of
Vigotsky "grew stronger. The latter came to represent the new interpretations
of Soviet psychologists.
Dialectic Psychology
Recent thinking in the Soviet Union about the philosophical foundation
of the behavioral and social sciences seems to follow the viewpoints expressed
by French sociologists. In regarding psychic activities as the joint outcome
of inner biological and outer sociocultural conditions they too reject a
central and independent role for psychology. In contrast to the reductionism
of French sociologists~ they do not merely split these conditions apart but
emphasize interactive processes through which psychic activity and consciousness
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emerge. Moreover, they consider these interactions in their temporal
dependencies and thus provide dialectic interpretations. Similar to Piaget,
changes in psychic activities may produce changes in inner biological
conditions and these~ in turn~ may change psychic activities. In contrast
to Piaget, however, there exist also active interventions from the outer
sociocultural to the psychic conditions and vice versa.
Soviet psychology has its roots in two separate movements: The reflex-
ology of Sechenov, Bechterev and Pavlov and the dialectic materialism of
Marx, Engels and Lenin. The first foundation is sufficiently known and
does not need to concern us in detail. It is, however, important to
emphasize that in contrast to the behaviorists, who mechanistically split
the reflex arc into its superficial external components, i.e., the stimulus
and the response, Pavlov regarded the reflex as a functional unit. Only
an extended conditioning history will enable the organism to separate out
the stimulus from the response. In the Soviet conception, at this stage,
the response becomes a reaction to the stimulus but, at the same time, the
response reflects upon the stimulus. This anti-mechanistic notion became
a fundamental ingredient of the Soviet interpretations and is referred to
by Rubinstejn as "cons t Lt.ut.Lve relationism. II Interestingly enough, the
same viewpoints were expressed in one of the founding articles of American
functionalism, i.e., in John Dewey's (1896) treatise on the reflex arc,
which, often misunderstood, was soon discarded from consideration by
American psychologists.
The first foundation of Soviet psychology relates psychic activities
to their inner biochemical material basis. The second foundation relates
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them to their outer cultural-historical material' basis. This conceptualiza-
tion builds upon the historical arid dialectical materialism of Marx and
Engels that wasinJ ected into Soviet psychology through the posthumous
publication of Lenin's (1929) philosophical notebook. The discussions
emerging after this event elaborated, in particular~ two notions, the
dialectic inte~pretatiori of opposites and dialectic leaps.
By emphasizing the interaction between psychic and cultural-historical
activitie~, Soviet psychoiogists recognized ihe social dependency of the
former. As psychic a~tiviti~s emerge (and their emerg~nce is~ of course.
co de't e rrnf.na d by their interaction with biological activities) ~ the social
conditions are being changed as well. Through his own labor--as Marx stated--
man transforms the conditions around him which~ in turn. will change him
(or at leas t~ the generations foliowing him). Thus. man creates himself
through his own labor. For instance, by inventing a tool~ by generating
un Lqueiconceptua.l or linguistic expressions ~ man produces a las ting effect
which "backfire-s lr upon him and the following generations of individuals,
whd thus~ will emerge under changed conditions. At least in regard to its
psychosocial implication, the notion of dialectic interpenetration explains
the superficiality of the thesis that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.
Both 's equences are bound to coincide because both are the product of human
efforts.
The principle of progression by qualitative leaps is closely related to
that ~I dialect{c interpenetration. It resembles Piaget's description of
cognd ti~e development, though- it emphas izes the interaction between psychic
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activity and outer, material cultural-historical conditions rather than
intra-psychic shifts captured by Piaget's dialectic contrast of assimila-
tion and accommodation. As our previous examples imply, dialectic leaps
are brought about by.human activity. Thus, the invention of tools, of
linguistic expressions, or of language in general, changes dramatically
the sociocultural conditions under Which human beings are growing up.
Inversely, as these sociocultural conditions have come into existence
during the history of mankind, they will induce upon the organism stepwise
changes, each reflecting basic reorganizations of the oeprations which the
individual will be able to perform, e.g., to speak, to write, to formalize,
etc.
Our last statements indicate, once more, the intimate connections between
functional changes produced by human activities and the structural shifts
representing the products of these activities. Thus, our discussion returns
to the interpretations advanced by Piaget. The interactive process of shifts
is not restricted to the activities of the individual, however, but embraces
all other individuals in his social world, nay, all individuals who through
their ceaseless efforts over generations have created the cultural-historical
conditions under which any present-day descendent grows up and, thus, lives.
During the third and most recent period in the short history of Soviet
psychology, a double interaction theory has been proposed by S. L. Rubinstejn
(1958, 1963; for English discussions see Payne, 1968; Riegel, 1972a, b; Wozniak,
1972). Rubinstejn's dialectic interpretation deviates from the dichotomizing
attempts of French sociologists. He agrees with them, however, in assigning
to psychology a secohdary role. Both biology and sociology, because of the
-29-
material foundations emphasized by Soviet psychologist's~ rest upon more
fundamental bases. Psychology is a construct and could not exist without
them.
Of course, these evaluations also indicate an intrinsic strength of
psychology. Psychology, more than biology and sociology, is or ought to
be concerned with activities rather than with products. This conciusion,
once more, returns our attention to the comparison of structure and function.
Rubinstejn agrees with Piaget by emphasizing the mutual dependence of both;
he disagrees with him (at least with Piaget's writings during the forties
and fifties) by emphasizing that the structure-function relationship ought
not to be limited to the activities of the separate individual but ought
to be extended to the interactions within his cultural-historical world.
He disagrees, furthermore, with Piaget by trying to trace the two inter-
actions to their material foundations.
Concluding Remarks
In our last section. Piaget's developmental structuralism was submerged
within Rubinstejn'sdouble interaction theory. Such an interpretation seems
to handle all those issues proposed in opposition to the traditional mechanistic
viewpoints of American psychology. i.e., issues which focus upon the active
organism in an active environment. However, in contradiction to their dialectic
foundation, Soviet psychologists have emphasized the material bases of psychic
processes. Thus, they have emphasized the products rather than the activities
that generate them. In concluding our t reatLs e , we will direct our attention
to alternative interpretations and review, once more, the trends and options
of modern psychology.
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Western psychology found one of its most authentic representations in
William Stern 's (193.5) Psychology on a Personalistic Basis whf.ch , appropri-
ately, has been criticized by Vigotsky (1962) as individualistic and
intellectualistic. Stern exemplifies a trend which derives from the British
philosophy of Locke, Hume. and Berkeley (especially the latter) and continues
to dominate Western thinking in the behavioral and social sciences. In
extension it led, as we have seen. to the positivism of Mach, to the
psychologism of Wundt, Helmholz, and KUlpe and to the phenomenologism of
Husser1. In spite of their wide differences, all of these scholars built
their interpretations upon sensation and perception as the basis for knowledge.
The world around us came to be regarded as a mere outward projection of the
mind. Psychology became the· most fundamental of all sciences.
Wh~le for the first group of scholars knowledge was to be gained through
sensory experience and contemplations based upon them, a second school of
thought, associated with the advances in the natural sciences, began to
emphasize the constructive aspects of knowledge. According to Russell and
Carnap, physics and astronomy, for example, represent prototypes of con-
structive sciences whose founding components, unlike psychological sensations)
are not directly accessible to us but are intellectually generated. From
this point of view, knowledge is founded upon the "sentence," in its German
sense of "Satz" and "setzen." Knowledge is gained by proposing sentences
rather than by receiving sensory information in a passive state.
Although related viewpoints were expressed early in psycho1ogy--for
example in Brentano's Act-Psychology (l874)--they never attained an apprecia-
tion comparable to those based upon a sensory basis of knowledge. However,
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philosophers have paid increasing attention to this issue as revealed in
the work of Russell and Carnap as well as in such antiscientific movements
as existentialism. More recently, Holzkamp (1972) has interpreted sciences
in general, and psychology in particular, as an activity and, therefore.
as a movement concerned with and dependent upon social conditions and
historical relevance. Most influential, however, is Piaget's (1950) notion
of the individual's intellectual development and of the growth of knowl-
edge in society, of genetic epistemology, based upon the premise that
progress can only occur through spontaneous, generative activities of the
organism.
Finally, science and knowledge represent forms of organization and
structure. Again, these organizations may either be seen as existing
outside the individual recognizable through sensory experience or as
generatively produced by the individual imposed upon the outside world
through his interpretations. Regardless of this choice, organizational
aspects have received increasing attention through the work of Avenarius,
Russell, Carnap, Piaget and, finally, Rubinstejn. Because of the complexity
of the struc t.ures , these theories have shown a strong tendency toward
formalism,· at least among the Western scholars. This trend is clearly ex-
emplified in the progression of Piaget's research and theory. He advanced--
in terms of his own theory--from an operative to a figurative psychology.
His early studies of early developmental periods consist of rich but ambiguous
interpretations of children's operations. Next he produced equally rich
displays of imaginative, though less than fully standardized, experiments
coupled with formal descriptions of the children's logic. In discussing the
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highest stage of development, he provides little else than an abstract model
of intellectual operations, essentially a theory on what these operations,
logically, ought to be. Supportive evidence is not supplied and, apparently,
not intended to be supplied. All that such evidence could consist of any-
how would be some superficial demonstrations which are neither sufficient
to confirm the consistency of the theory nor to suggest important extensions.
Piaget's theory ties structuralism to the perceptionism of the earlier
psychologists. Structures are confirmed by observations; structures organize
experience. Soviet psychologists go beyond such a perceptionism and consider
their evidence as originating from the material world outside of the observer.
In contrast to earlier materialistic interpretations, they insist, however,
that these conditions are not independent of the human organism; they are
as much the product of human labor as they are forces impinging upon the
human being. While Soviet psychologists opt for constructive theories,
they abandon these theories all too soon "by emphasizing the objectified
material products rather than the activities by which these products are
generated. Piaget, on the other hand, while emphasizing activities rather
than material products, restricts himself to the developing individual under
exclusion of the cultural-historical activities within which the individual
grows.
A synthesizing extension would have to emphasize perception, action, and
organization both in the individual and in the society. By emphasizing the
products, this theory would be structural; by emphasizing the activities, it
would be transformationaL This theory would relate psychic activities both
to their inner biological and their outer sociocultural foundations without
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exclusive emphasis upon their material nature. These foundations become
material if the products and structures are emphasized; they remain psycho-
logical if the activities and transformations are emphasized. Development
proceeds through dialectic interactions between psychic activities and their
inner biological and outer sociocultural foundations. Again, if we look at
the objectified conditions. development represents. both for the individual
and for the society. a sequence of temporarily stable schemata; if we look
at the activities, development represents a constant flux of transformations.
Meiner, 1928. (Logical
University of California
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